Robust and simple authentication protocol (ROSI) is a highly efficient authentication protocol. However, its state-synchronization property makes it vulnerable to the denial of service (DOS) attack. This paper shows the DOS attack on the ROSI protocol, and proposes an improved scheme that conquers the weakness and extends its key agreement function, and improves the server's performance.
INTRODUCTION
The password-based authentication protocol is the conventional authentication protocol in many distributed systems to authenticate the remote users. However, a passwordbased protocol is vulnerable to the guessing attack, the replay attack, the stolen-verifier problem and the forgery attack [1] . These attacks bother the SAS protocol [2] , the revised SAS-1 [3] , the revised SAS-2 [3] and the OSPA protocol [4] . Based on low-cost smart cards that support only simple hashing operations, ROSI [5] is a highly efficient password-based authentication protocol. Its simplicity, resistance to existing known attacks and high performance make it much more attractive than its counterparts [2, 3, 4] . However, the protocol requires state synchronization between the client and the server, and we shall exploit this property to launch the DOS attack on the ROSI protocol. We shall also propose an improved scheme that conquers the weakness and extends its key agreement function, and improves the server's performance.
REVIEW OF CHIEN AND JAN'S PROTOCOL
When the user wants to log in to the server, he has to insert his smart card into the login device and to key-in his ID and password S into the smart card device. Then the smart card performs the following steps:
Step 1. client → server: (ID, c 1 , c 2 ) The smart card first extracts h(x ID) by computing S ⊕ R. Note that the smart card stores R = h(x ID) ⊕ S and h(S N i ). The smart card generates a new nonce N i+1 for next authentication. Note that i denotes the ith login. Then the smart card computes c 1 
The smart card sends (ID, c 1 , c 2 ) to the server.
Step 2. server
The server extracts h 2 (S N i+1 ) in the c 1 by using x, ID and the verified value h 2 (S N i ). Then the server computes the hashed value of h 2 (S N i+1 ) and uses it to compute the XOR operation with c 2 to get h(S N i ). If the hashed value of the h(S N i ) is same as the h 2 (S N i ) in the database, the server accepts this connection and sends (h 2 (S N i ) ⊕ h 3 (S N i+1 )) to the client. Finally, the server uses h 2 (S N i+1 ) to replace h 2 (S N i ).
Step 3. After the message is received, the smart card verifies whether the (h 2 (S N i ) ⊕ h 3 (S N i+1 )) is correct or not. If it is correct, the smart card uses h(S N i+1 ) to replace h(S N i ).
DOS ATTACK ON THE ROSI PROTOCOL
Step 1 . The client sends his authentication information,
, to the server. Now, the attacker intercepts it and sends a confounded number r attacker to the server and client, respectively. Hence, the client and server cannot succeed in connecting. Neither the server's verified data, h 2 (S N i ), nor the smart card's authenticated information, h(S N i ), is changed.
Step 2 . Then the client sends another authenticated information to the server, (ID,
Note that the smart card chooses another new nonce N i+1 for the user's next authentication. However, the attacker intercepts it and sends the previous message in Step 1 to the server. We can find the message is valid and the server sends (h 2 
Step 3 . Similarly, the attacker intercepts it and computes N i+1 ) . Finally, the attacker uses the computed value to compute the XOR operation with H.-Y. Chien, R.-C. Wang and C.-C. Yang server's response message h 2 (S N i ) ⊕ h 3 (S N i+1 ). We can find the attacker gets (h 2 (S N i ) ⊕ h 3 (S N i+1 )) and sends it to the client.
Step 4 . The message (h 2 (S N i ) ⊕ h 3 (S N i+1 )) can pass the verification of the client. However, the client cannot use h 2 (S N i+1 ) to log in to the server next time, because it is different from h 2 (S N i+1 ) which was saved by the server.
THE IMPROVED ROSI SCHEME
The ROSI protocol requires state synchronization between the client and the server. We, therefore, exploit this property to launch the DOS attack on the ROSI protocol. Actually, any communication protocol that requires state synchronization between the client and the server would be vulnerable to the DOS attack since an attacker may interrupt the protocol run after one side of the communicating entities has updated its state. This is actually the Byzantine generals problem [6] . To conquer this attack, we should eliminate the state synchronization requirement. We also argue that any secure authentication protocol should establish the session key simultaneously; otherwise, the communications following the authentication would not be well protected. Based on low-cost smart cards that support only simple hashing operations, we propose the improved-ROSI scheme that authenticates the remote user and establishes the session key simultaneously.
The improved scheme
Let h( ) denote a secure one-way hash function, such as SHA-1. h(m) means m is hashed once, and h 2 (m) means that m is hashed twice. S denotes the user's password, x denotes the server's strong secret key which is only known to the server, denotes concatenation and ⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR operation. The improved-ROSI scheme consists of two phases-the registration phase, and the authentication and key establishment phase.
Registration phase
(i) The user submits his identity, ID and password, S, to the server through a secure channel.
(ii) The server issues the user a smart card that stores R = h(x ID) ⊕ S and h( ).

Authentication and key establishment phase
The user who has obtained the server-issued smart card can perform the following steps to log on to the server and establish fresh session keys with the server. . If the verification fails, it refuses the request; otherwise, mutual authentication is done and the fresh session key K is confirmed.
RELATED WORKS AND DISCUSSIONS
The works proposed by Leighton and Micali [7] and Zheng [8] are related to this improved-ROSI scheme. Both the works utilized tamper-proof cards to facilitate key distribution. However, rather than being key agreement protocols, these two schemes [7, 8] can be viewed as key distribution schemes only because the generated common key K i,j between two entities U i and U j is always fixed, and either entity can use this key K i,j to deliver a new session key to the other. There is no guarantee for session key freshness and fair control of the generation of the session key by the two communicating entities. They, therefore, do not provide key confirmation and cannot resist known key attack and replay attack (these properties are important for a secure key agreement protocol [9] ). As Leighton and Micali [7] pointed out, it is not trivial to extend their basic key distribution to a full function key agreement protocol, considering possible sophisticated attacks.
In contrast, the improved-ROSI protocol is a key authentication protocol with key confirmation. The protocol requires five hashing operations both on the client and the server. It eliminates the stored verifiers on the server, and, therefore, improves the server's performance. To achieve mutual authentication and key confirmation, it requires three message runs. Compared to the ROSI protocol, the improved-ROSI scheme needs one additional message run while it improves the security, the functionality and the server's performance.
We can further extend our work from a server-based key agreement protocol to a trusted agent-based key agreement protocol, borrowing the ideas from Zheng's work [8] . In this setting, the trusted agent issues each legal entity U i a tamper-resistant card that stores the agent's secret key x and the entity's identity ID i . It is assumed that even the owner of the card cannot read or alter the content of the card, and the encoded identities are prefix-free [8] . To extend our solution to this setting, we just replace all the occurrences of h(x ID) with h(x ID i ID j ) (if ID i < ID j ) or with h(x ID j ID i ) (if ID i > ID j ) in our protocol. This extension allows that any two entities that are registered under the same trusted agent can authenticate each other with session key confirmation.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has shown the DOS attack on the ROSI protocol, and has proposed the improved ROSI-scheme to conquer the weakness and achieve mutual key confirmation. Compared to the ROSI protocol, it needs one additional message run while improving the server's performance.
